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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Beverly Ohntrup, acting as the Administrator of the Estate of Robert Ohntrup, 
Deceased, and in her own right (“Ohntrup”), appeals from the order of the United States 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying her requests for additional 
post-judgment discovery from Intervenor Alliant Techsystems, Inc. (“ATK”).  We will 
affirm. 
I. 
 In 1975, a pistol manufactured by Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu 
(“MKEK”) malfunctioned, firing a bullet through Robert’s hand.  Robert and his wife, 
Beverly, filed a products liability action against the seller of the pistol (Firearms Center, 
Inc.) and its owners.  Defendants then impleaded MKEK, which is wholly owned by the 
Republic of Turkey.  After a bench trial, the District Court entered a final judgment 
holding the seller and MKEK jointly liable for $847,173.97 and obliging MKEK to 
indemnify the seller.  MKEK appealed, and we affirmed.  See Appeal of Makina Ve 
Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu, 760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985).  The Ohntrups have tried in vain 
to collect their judgment.  Robert died of cancer, and Beverly obtained a $16 million civil 
contempt judgment against MKEK.  The original judgment continues to increase by ten 
percent every year to account for delay damages, and the contempt judgment likewise 
grows by $10,000 per year until MKEK complies with its discovery obligations. 
 In 2011, Ohntrup learned about a $16.2 million transaction between ATK, a 
Minneapolis-based company, and MKEK.  ATK agreed to sell manufacturing 
components for 25 mm cannon ammunition to MKEK.  She filed a motion for 
supplementary relief in aid of execution pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
69(a) and Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3118.  On the recommendation of the 
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Magistrate Judge, the District Court denied Ohntrup’s request to enjoin ATK from 
transferring property in its possession that MKEK owns but granted her request for post-
judgment discovery.  ATK produced its current agreements with MKEK as well as 
information on its shipments to Turkey and MKEK’s finances. Ohntrup claimed that the 
responses were deficient, but the Magistrate Judge determined that ATK was not required 
to supplement its responses with specific information on future shipments.  ATK was 
served with additional sets of discovery requests, and it moved to quash.  The Magistrate 
Judge concluded that the discovery requests were not proper.  Upon review of the 
Magistrate Judge’s order, the District Court held that the additional discovery would 
constitute an undue burden under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4011(b) because, 
inter alia, “discovery may be futile if the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 
U.S.C. § 1330 et seq., protects the components from attachment.”  Ohntrup v. Makina Ve 
Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu, 760 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 Ohntrup appealed.  We vacated the District Court’s order on the grounds that it 
“improperly considered the possibility that discovery might be futile without determining 
whether that was in fact the case.”  Id.  We accordingly remanded the case so that the 
District Court “may analyze the question anew.”  Id.  “[I]f MKEK’s munitions 
manufacturing components are immune from attachment, then the District Court should 
deny Ohntrup’s discovery request ‘because information that could not possibly lead to 
executable assets is simply not “relevant” to execution in the first place.’”  Id. at 296-97 
(quoting Republic of Arg. v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2257 (2014)).  In other 
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words, “if [ATK] can persuade the District Court that Ohntrup cannot attach the targeted 
property, then Ohntrup’s discovery would be irrelevant under [Pa. R. Civ. P.] 4011(c).”  
Id. at 297.  If the District Court determines that the property is not immune, this 
determination would obviously weigh in favor of Ohntrup.  Id.  “Finally, if the District 
Court chooses not to decide whether the targeted property is subject to attachment or 
lacks sufficient information to reach a definitive conclusion on the issue before 
discovery, any speculation in that regard should not be a factor in the Court’s 
unreasonable burden analysis.”  Id. (citing NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. at 2257-58).  
On remand, ATK was served with updated discovery requests, and it, once again, 
objected to the requests.  The District Court ruled in favor of ATK.  In its order, the 
District Court explained that, “[f]or the reasons stated on the record at the October 23, 
2014 hearing, the targeted property falls within the [FSIA] military property exception to 
execution immunity.”  (A3.) 
II. 
Subject to certain exceptions, the FSIA grants jurisdictional and execution 
immunity to foreign states as well as their agencies and instrumentalities.1  See 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1604, 1609.  Although there is an exception to execution immunity for commercial 
property, see 28 U.S.C. § 1610, the statutory scheme provides that, notwithstanding this 
                                                 
1  The District Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See, e.g., Ohntrup, 
760 F.3d at 294 (“We join those courts in holding that a judgment creditor may appeal 
from the denial of discovery in aid of execution.”).  The Court reviews a district court’s 
order denying discovery for an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., id. at 296. 
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exception, the property is immune from attachment and execution if: 
(2) the property is, or is intended to be, used in connection with a military 
activity and 
 
(A) is of a military character, or 
 
(B) is under the control of a military authority or defense agency. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2).  The parties agree that it was ATK’s burden to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the property at issue here is immune under this 
“military property” exception.      
 Complying with our mandate, the District Court appropriately determined that 
ATK satisfied this burden.  Gregory Just, ATK’s contracts manager, testified that the 
manufacturing components are unique to, and can only be used for, the manufacture of 
25 mm cannon ammunition.  ATK also presented evidence (including video footage 
showing the ammunition being fired by cannons mounted on a ship, carrier aircraft, and a 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle) indicating that this ammunition is much larger than the kinds 
of ammunition used for civilian purposes like hunting and that it has no civilian uses.  As 
the District Court aptly explained, “a 25 millimeter instrument of war that’s used to 
pierce” tank armor is not used “for hunting” or similar activities.   (A636.)  Federal law 
further requires ATK to satisfy an extensive review process in order to export the 
property to MKEK.  For instance, it had to obtain a manufacturing license agreement, 
i.e., “[a]n agreement (e.g., contract) whereby a U.S. person grants a foreign person an 
authorization to manufacture defense articles abroad.” 22 C.F.R. § 120.21.  The State 
Department notified Congress of a proposed agreement “for the manufacture of 
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significant military equipment abroad,” involving the export of defense articles for the 
continued manufacture of ammunition and components “for sale to the Turkish Ministry 
of Defense, as well as buyers in the approved sales territory.”  (A205-A209.)  MKEK 
also certified—in the required DSP-83 (“Nontransfer and Use Certificate”) forms—that it 
is the “end-user of the articles/data” and that it “will not re-export, resell or otherwise 
dispose of any of those articles/data” outside the identified country (Turkey) or to any 
other person unless it receives prior written approval from the State Department.2  (A375, 
A438.)   
According to Ohntrup, the District Court failed to comply with this Court’s 
mandate and abused its discretion by basing its determination on “speculation and 
insufficient evidence.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 17.)  Ohntrup focuses on ATK’s alleged 
concession that it has no proof of what is done with the property it sells to MKEK.  Just 
acknowledged that, aside from the DSP-83 certifications, “you don’t know once it’s in 
their hands what happens to it.”  (A606).  The FSIA, however, does not require ATK to 
prove with absolute certainty what will happen to the property once it is in the possession 
of a foreign sovereign entity.  Likewise, even if the party seeking discovery was able to 
present some evidence arguably indicating that the property does not fall under the 
                                                 
2 Ohntrup objects to the District Court’s admission of the DSP-83s, arguing that 
they are hearsay and do not qualify for the business records exception.  Because we can 
confidently conclude that the “military property” exception applies here without 
considering these documents, we need not address this issue—which, incidentally, was 
raised by Ohntrup in her opening brief only in passing.  Even assuming the rules of 
evidence strictly apply in post-judgment discovery proceedings and the documents 
constitute inadmissible hearsay, their admission was harmless given the other evidence 
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“military property” exception (e.g., an MKEK catalog categorizing 25 mm cannon 
ammunition as “heavy weapons ammunition” and stating that MKEK’s “Heavy Weapons 
Factory is ready to meet all domestic and international demand in military or civilian 
projects” (A147)), this does not necessarily mean that the district court thereby abused its 
discretion by finding that the other party established by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the property is intended to be used in connection with military activities.  Like 
Ohntrup—who unfortunately has been unable to collect the judgments entered against 
MKEK—ATK cannot compel this foreign entity to offer evidence in this discovery 
dispute.  Given the evidence presented by ATK, we conclude that the District Court 
neither abused its discretion by determining that ATK met its burden nor improperly 
relied on speculation in making this determination.    
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.   
                                                                                                                                                             
concerning the intended use of the property.    
